Abstract-Assessing the potential ecological impact of ionising radiation raises a number of ethical questions. These include fundamental questions such as what exactly constitutes harming the environment, and how the environment should be valued, as well as links to political protection principles such as sustainability and biodiversity. Starting from developments within ecological risk assessment, this paper summarises some of the ethical issues concerning the protection of the environment from radiation. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of different philosophical and cultural world views on valuing the environment in a context of radiation risk. Chapter 3 addresses some recent challenges to proposed environmental protection frameworks, including practical applications following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, and some scientific developments such as the ecosystem approach. Finally, Chapter 4 offers some recommendations on how ethical evaluation can help produce a more robust and transparent approach to the protection of the environment. In conclusion, there is a need for a holistic evaluation of the environmental impacts of ionising radiation that not only considers the direct consequences on the health of humans and non-human species, but also the more complex social, ethical, and economic consequences of both human and non-human exposures.
INTRODUCTION
There is growing consensus that radiation risk management needs to address the question of effects on the environment (Pentreath, 1998 (Pentreath, , 1999 IUR, 2002 ; IAEA, This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. 2002; ICRP, 2003 ICRP, , 2007 . Prior to this, radiological protection was almost exclusively concerned with humans, under the assumption that limits on exposure of humans will usually entail sufficient protection to the environment (ICRP, 1991, Para. 16 ). Challenges to this approach included the fact that it was not in line with the assessment and management of other environmental stressors, and that there were a number of cases (e.g. marine or geological disposal) where wildlife and ecosystems could be exposed to high levels of radiation even when human doses were low. Thus, a requirement to address the impacts on non-human organisms explicitly is now part of international radiological protection recommendations and standards (ICRP, 2007; IAEA, 2011) , as well as national strategy in a number of countries (Copplestone et al., 2009) .
However, consideration of the impacts of ionising radiation on the environment raises a number of ethical challenges. For example, while most scientists would agree that radiation can cause various types of change in ecosystems, from genetic mutations to ecosystem level changes, the degree to which this change represents harm can be a matter of debate. Could one posit that the environment is damaged in some way by the mere presence of man-made radionuclides? Should genetic changes be seen as a beneficial adaptation of organisms to stress, or biomarkers that warn of potential damage? How should one address the indirect effects on either humans or ecosystems?
Many of the international organisations involved in the development of tools and frameworks for assessing environmental risks have recognised that producing a practical and coherent system of radiological protection for wildlife raises a number of philosophical and ethical questions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2002) produced a report on 'Ethical Considerations in Protecting the Environment from the Effects of Ionizing Radiation', which addressed the cultural, scientific, and social influences on environmental world views, as well as internationally recognised agreements, such as protection of sustainability and biodiversity. These aspects have also been addressed in the International Union of Radioecology (IUR, 2002 (IUR, , 2012 and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 2003) reports on environmental protection. Common to all approaches is the recognition of diversity in ethical and cultural views on valuing the environment, and acknowledgement that this diversity should be respected in the environmental protection frameworks. This paper reviews and summarises some of the main ethical issues concerning the protection of the environment from radiation, and looks at more recent developments in radiation risk assessment on environmental protection 1 . Chapter 2 gives a short overview of the different philosophical world views on valuing the environment in a context of radiation risk. This is followed by Chapter 3, an evaluation of some of the more recent challenges to the proposed environmental protection frameworks, including practical applications following the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Finally, Chapter 4 offers some recommendations about how ethical evaluation can help produce a robust and transparent approach to the protection of the environment from ionising radiation.
PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD VIEWS
Environmental ethicists have been debating the matter of why one attaches value to the environment for a number of decades (Rolston, 1988; Sterba, 1994) . Central philosophical issues include the question of moral standing, and whether the environment has intrinsic or inherent value (i.e. value in itself) or extrinsic or instrumental value (i.e. value because of human interest). Although environmental ethics is a relatively young field within philosophy, a number of distinct views on this question have emerged. In contemporary environmental philosophy, the most fundamental source of divergence arises between the anthropocentric view and the non-anthropocentric view.
Anthropocentism
An anthropocentric ethic (literally human-centred) alleges that only humans have moral standing, and that environmental degradation only matters as long as it influences human interests (Norton, 1988; Bookchin, 1993) . In defence of anthropocentrism, both scientists and philosophers have argued that human interests can provide a powerful set of motives for protecting nature (Sober, 1986) . Understanding the economic and social impacts of environmental damage on humans can provide a strong incentive to protect the ecosystem.
Anthropocentrics would be concerned about impacts of radiation on animals and plants (and even soil and water, should that impact the human use of the resources), but they would not consider these entities to have moral standing or value in themselves, only by virtue of the consequences to humans. Nevertheless, despite the fact that anthropocentists may agree that humans have a responsibility not to damage the environment, they can still disagree on what measures are needed to correct human behaviour, and when intervention will be necessary to protect the environment.
ICRP (1977) stated that 'if man is protected, other living species are also likely to be sufficiently protected'. This is widely perceived to be an anthropocentric approach to environmental protection, and understandable when combined with the strong historical human focus on radiological protection. Exposure experiments on animals were performed largely to provide information on human effects; the majority of studies on environmental transfer concentrated on those food chains with humans at the top. However, whilst the statement is clearly an anthropocentric approach to risk assessment, it does not necessarily mean that radiological protection does not value the environment per se.
Biocentrism
Proponents of biocentrism (literally 'life-centred') assert that individual life forms other than humans can have moral standing, and should be respected for what they are, not only because they affect the interests of humans. Different biocentric views exist regarding which criterion forms the basis for moral standing, and what hierarchy (if any) exists between different species. However, all views derive moral value from some biological characteristic of individual members of species, such as sentience, the ability to feel pleasure or pain (Singer, 1991) , self-consciousness (Regan, 1980) , inherent worth, or a 'good of their own' of all living things (Goodpaster, 1978; Taylor, 1986) .
As biocentrism focusses on individuals rather than the diversity of species, these various outlooks have also been described as an 'individualistic' environmental ethic (Sagoff, 1984; Rolston, 1991) . In practical policy making, biocentric outlooks have had the greatest influence in issues of animal welfare and the use of animals in research (Sagoff, 1984) . The ICRP Reference Animals and Plants (RAPs) approach is consistent with a biocentric methodology for assessing radiation effects on individual non-human species. As discussed below, this does not necessarily make it a biocentric value basis for protecting those individuals. The idea of including impacts on animals in radiological protection optimisation is also compatible with a broadly sentience-based, utilitarian approach. In this case, optimisation would include both the direct impacts of radiation on non-humans, as well as the more general (and often more damaging) consequences for the environment of reducing doses to humans [see Oughton et al. (2004) for examples of side-effects of accident remediation on the environmental and animal welfare]. Nevertheless, optimisation in radiological protection rarely considers exactly why one is bothered about environmental impacts, and there can, of course, still be disagreements on which species and which effects matter. For example, Singer's (1991) criterion of sentience only encompasses vertebrates, whereas Taylor (1986) suggested that all living organisms are equal moral subjects (egalitarian biocentrism) as each has some goal to its existence.
Ecocentrism
Supporters of an ecocentric philosophy claim that the diversity of species, ecosystems, rivers, mountains, and landscapes can have value in themselves, irrespective of the consequences on humans or other individuals of non-human species. All ecocentrics provide particular value to the diversity, dynamics, and interactions within healthy ecosystems, but differ in their views on the causes of, and proper solutions to, modern environmental problems. Callicott (1979 Callicott ( , 1989 and Naess (1974) both see the Western, instrumental view of nature as a main source of environmental problems. Ecofeminists suggest that the problem lies in the history of male dominance and the sexist oppression of females (Warren, 1990 ); other problems stem from the social and economic structure of society (Bookchin, 1993) .
Most ecocentrics claim that mankind needs a radical change from an anthropocentric attitude of domination and exploitation of natural resources towards a greater respect for the integrity of nature. In evaluating actions, Callicott defends the land-ethic maxim of Aldo Leopold (1949) , 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise.' The general concern for the biotic and abiotic community as a whole has led this outlook to be classified by many philosophers as a 'holistic' ethic (in contrast to the individualist biocentric view) (Sagoff, 1984) . The inclusion of the abiotic components of the environment in ecocentrism, together with the fact that most definitions of the environment in international legislation include man, biota, abiota, and physical surroundings, raises the issue of how to deal with the abiota (i.e. soil, rocks, water) in environmental protection. Although many environmental standards are based on concentrations in media, these usually reflect their value as habitats.
In radiological protection, the ecocentric view has been linked to the ecosystem approach of environmental assessment and management (IUR, 2012) , and is sometimes presented as an alternative to the RAPs approach by ICRP (2008) . One of the criticisms of the RAPs approach is that the 12 selected species do not permit an ecosystem level assessment. To do this, one needs a broader range of ecologically relevant species covering producers, predators, and decomposers, as well as insights into the differences in sensitivity of species (Brechignac et al., 2011; Bradshaw et al., 2014) ; variability in sensitivity is a driving factor for ecosystem change as some species can prosper by the impacts on others. This does not mean that the ICRP approach is not capable of providing relevant information; it is simply not sufficient in addressing the ecosystem level impacts. As mentioned above, the method of performing an environmental impact assessment should not be taken as the same as ascribing moral value to those entities. As discussed below, many ecosystem service approaches to environmental protection are blatantly anthropocentric in both their approach and underlying value system.
Common ethical principles
Despite the apparent diversity of these three theories, it is important to realise that although they may disagree quite strongly over exactly why certain factors are relevant to ethics, there can still be room for consensus on some common features. For evaluation of any actions involving radiation exposure of humans, animals, or plants, each of the above theories would find it morally relevant to ask: (1) who and what are being affected; (2) what is the relative size of the benefits and harms arising from the exposure; (3) what is the distribution of the risks and benefits; and (4) what alternative courses of action are available? With respect to protection of the environment and non-human species, all theories can defend the principle that radiological protection should not be limited to humans. As regulations already exist for the protection of the environment from other contaminants, and all other things are equal, there is no ethically relevant reason why effects caused by radiation exposure should be treated differently. This was one of the driving forces for expanding the system of protection from humans to other species.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
Both IAEA and ICRP have identified a number of primary environmental protection principles that are supported by the different philosophical world views and have been enshrined in international conventions. These include respect for sustainable development, environmental justice, human dignity, biodiversity, and conservation.
Sustainable development relates to the need to recognise the interdependence of economic development, environmental protection, and social equity, and thus the obligation to protect and provide for both the human and environmental needs of present and future generations (WCED, 1997) . Internationally, the concept is linked to the World Commission on Environmental Development, or 'Brundtland report', but also consolidated in the United Nations (UN) 'Rio' Declaration of 1992 (UN, 1992) .
Environmental justice recognises that inequity can and does arise between the distribution of what might be termed 'environmental benefits and harm', and calls for a more equitable distribution. As ratified in the Å rhus Convention, it also relates to the importance of affected persons having access to information and participation in decision-making processes in environmental matters (UNECE, 1998). Environmental justice features in the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992), including the explicit responsibility to ensure that activities within the national jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states.
Respect for human dignity is the cornerstone of the Charter of the UN (1945), but also has relevance to the concept of environmental protection and how it can be achieved. For example, it recognises the need for the respect of individual human rights, and for the consequent range of human views on valuing the environment. Stakeholder engagement is another practice that respects human dignity.
There are many international agreements relating to the conservation of both species and habitats. They essentially relate to the 'importance' or 'vulnerability' attached to individual species, or areas where many species live, particularly with regard to the need for agreement at an international level in order to protect them.
The obligation of maintaining biodiversity also stems from the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992), and it recognises the need to maintain the biological diversity inherent within each species, amongst different species, and amongst different types of habitats and ecosystems.
Agreement on principles does not mean that disagreement will not arise over how those principles might be applied. There can still be different perspectives on which types of effects matter most: for example, depending on whether harms are evaluated in terms of sentience, animal rights, consequences for existing humans, or effects on future generations.
ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF RADIATION

When does change become damage?
The environmental impacts of both Chernobyl and Fukushima are a matter of ongoing debate (Smith, 2008; Beresford and Copplestone, 2011) , despite an agreement that radiation exposure can cause changes in biota. It is accepted that deterministic and stochastic effects in plants, insects, and animals have been seen both in the laboratory and after serious accidents, and that species can show large variations in radiosensitivity (UNSCEAR, 2008) . The Chernobyl accident caused a number of environmental changes, ranging from reduction in soil invertebrates to alleged DNA damage and genetic mutations in a number of species (IAEA, 2005; Møller and Mosseau, 2009; Garnier-Laplace et al., 2013) . Damage to pine trees in the Red Forest resulted in the pine forests being replaced by the more radioresistant birch (IAEA, 2005) . Immediately after the Fukushima accident, questions were raised about the possible ecosystem effects, and studies claiming impacts on butterflies and birds in contaminated areas (Hiyama et al., 2013; Fujita et al., 2015; Bonisoli-Alquati et al., 2015; Garnier-Laplace et al., 2015) , although not without controversy (UNSCEAR, 2015) , were widely reported in both the scientific and traditional media.
In addition to scientific debate about the cause of such changes, scientists also disagree over whether or not these changes reflect permanent or serious ecological damage; after all, the forests grew back, the wildlife returned, and genetic change is not always a bad thing (Baker et al., 1996) . A number of people have suggested that the ecological benefit of removing humans from the Chernobyl area might outweigh any radiation detriments (Mycio, 1999) . The consequences that are deemed 'harmful' may differ with the level of protection awarded to the various components of the environment (individual, population, species, ecosystem). This, in turn, can depend on the moral standing of those components.
The regulation on human radiation exposure takes effects on individuals very seriously. Management of environmental hazards tends to disregard low rates of stochastic effects, focussing instead on the risk of harm to populations. In this respect, most environmental risk managers make a clear moral distinction between human and non-human species; individual humans matter, whereas individual animals tend not to matter. The types of radiation exposure that result in observable (and probably, therefore, unacceptable) damage on a population level are thought to be far higher than the mGy levels at which intervention to protect humans takes place. While this might be true for mortality, it need not be the case for other biological endpoints such as reproductive ability and genetic effects. In some cases, such as for endangered species, effects on the individual are deemed to matter, even if not quite as much as for individual humans. Of course, the variety of non-anthropocentric views may offer quite different interpretations and explanations on this last point. Some may be offended by the mere presence of man-made radionuclides in the environment, irrespective of any discernible effect on humans or biota.
Ecosystem approach and ecosystem services
The interrelationship between the environment, economy, and society is grounded in the principle of sustainable development, and a central component of an ecosystem approach to environmental protection (Costanza et al., 1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) . This approach focusses on the ecosystem, rather than single species, and the sustainable use of resources. It stresses the inherent dynamic interactions between system components (including humans), potential feedback loops, indirect effects, and resilience. The concepts of ecosystem services and ecological economics are aimed predominantly at the ultimate benefits of ecosystems for humans, either financially or otherwise, while the ecosystem approach is arguably less human-centred. Nevertheless, all approaches share a fundamental recognition of the integration and interdependency of humans and the environment.
This type of holistic analysis is also in line with ecosystem approaches to environmental impact assessment, as proposed by IUR (2012) and other environmentalists (Suter and Bartell, 1993) as a possible way of reconciling anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric world views in practice. Assessment of ecosystem services is an increasingly recognised approach to document the consequences of ecosystem changes, especially with reference to economic and societal values (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) . However, the approach is not without controversy, particularly with respect to monetary valuation and the practical implementation of the approach (Spash, 2008; Kapustka and McCormick, 2015) . Some ecologists have suggested that the root of the problem is capitalism itself, and, in turn, the reduction of all societal values to profits and losses. In a market economy, nothing can be sacred, since to be sacred means to be 'non-exchangeable' (Kovel, 1993; Spash, 2008 ).
An analysis of the economic consequences of the Japan tsunami and Fukushima accident on fishing industries highlights some of the challenges and controversies in such assessments. Direct economic costs include damage to the fishing industry infrastructure and the loss of seafood and marine product sales. However, the ecological economist Shunsuke Managi pointed out that as Japanese fishing industries were heavily subsided, the Japanese Government is actually saving money through fishing restrictions (Pacchioli, 2013) . Managi also noted that some might see the opportunities to rebuild and rejuvenate the fishing industry (Pacchioli, 2013) . While there may be concerns about the potential impact of the ionising radiation on marine species, there are also ecological benefits from banning or restricting fishing over large areas. Note that none of the above points should be seen as reasons to 'justify' the accident; they illustrate the complexities in performing ecosystem service assessments, and stress that different parts of the community can be impacted in different ways (Oughton, 2011; Oughton and Howard, 2012) . The accident and contamination caused immense societal hardships on the lives of those affected, including complex demographic changes in the predominately young, and people moving out of contaminated areas and not continuing in family businesses (IAEA, 2015) .
Recognising some of the more fundamental concerns that ecocentrics have about the links between ecological damage and monetary valuation of natural resources is perhaps the most important recommendation, such that damage is not only assessed in terms of instrumental value. Assessors should also respect the idea of intrinsic value of plants, animals, and the environment.
CONCLUSIONS
Supporters of both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics can agree that harms to non-human populations should be avoided. They may disagree on the level of population change that can be accepted, and which populations should be considered as the most important to protect. Anthropocentrics and ecocentrics may focus on endangered species or habitats, and biocentrics may focus on certain individuals as having value in themselves. Both anthropocentrics and ecocentrics may find it necessary to address changes in the abiotic environment, such as increased concentrations of radionuclides in soil, water, and air. Anthropocentrics support that such views may arise from aesthetics or a wish to 'preserve' 'pristine' environments such as the Arctic; ecocentric support may arise from consideration of the inherent value of all components of the ecosystem. Although population effects can be an appropriate focus for environmental protection from ionising radiation, this is unlikely to be at the exclusion of effects on individuals, ecosystems, or even the abiotic environment itself. There are likely to be cases where consideration of individual impacts (e.g. endangered species) or pristine environments would be appropriate.
The variety of cultural and religious beliefs about the way that humans perceive nature, and the differences in opinion on what has moral standing and why can have a strong influence on the question of what is ecological harm, and what is meant by it. Environmental policy needs to be able to acknowledge, respect, and protect this diversity in beliefs. It would be naive to expect radiological protection practitioners to resolve such fundamental problems within environmental philosophy, yet it is important that any framework developed should be sufficiently flexible to incorporate both anthropocentric and ecocentric values. To be successful, and broadly justifiable in practice, environmental policy needs to consider both issues (Rolston, 1991) .
Ethics should be seen as a tool rather than a burden in policy making. As there are no easy answers to the challenges highlighted above, any system of environmental protection should be sufficiently flexible to allow such conflicts to be addressed. Ethical evaluation can be valuable both in identifying controversies, in forcing decision makers to address the issues, and in clarifying the premises upon which decisions are being made. Showing that decision makers are aware of, and have considered, such conflicts is an important step in making ethical issues transparent in policy making. Ethical evaluations also encourage attempts to find alternative solutions in order to mitigate or avoid the ethical insult, and help document the assumptions and reasons behind eventual disputes. For instance, it is helpful to know whether experts disagree on ways of managing radiation risks due to a matter of fact (e.g. they might disagree about the environmental consequences or the probable cost of remediation) or a matter of ethics (e.g. they may disagree about the relative importance of human interests against those of non-human species).
Regarding radiological protection, most people would agree that harms caused by radiation exposure of non-human species should carry weight in optimisation and justification because the species has value in itself, and/or because of the potential consequences for future human generations. In this respect, protecting the environment from radiation will need to be put into context with the risks from other environmental contaminants and detriments. Unless there are clear and morally relevant grounds, radiation damage should not be treated differently from other hazards. The significant progress made in developing frameworks and tools for assessment of the effects of ionising radiation over the past two decades (e.g. ICRP, ERICA) means that decision makers have a much more robust scientific basis for comparison of the ecological impacts of radiation with other environmental stressors.
To conclude, there is a need for a holistic evaluation of the environmental impacts of ionising radiation that not only considers the direct consequences on the health of humans and non-human species, but also the more complex, social, ethical, and economic consequences of both human and non-human exposures. Ethical risk evaluation for both humans and the environment extends the issue of whether a risk is acceptable, into dimensions that go beyond its probability of harm; ethical risk management asks questions other than those connected simply to radiation dose and its economic costs.
